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Abstract
This article examines how decision makers in the EU legislative process reach consen-
sual decisions through the mechanism of ‘implicit voting’. I introduce a spatial model of
coalitional bargaining using a utility function incorporating decision makers’ consider-
ations of the policy gains they expect to obtain from the outcome and the policy
concessions they need to give other decision makers so as to have the outcome
accepted. The model predicts the formation of a compact coalition, which will be able
to implement the final policy. As a compact coalition typically integrates a majority of
like-minded legislators, consensual outcomes reached through coalition formations are
likely to occur under conditions of preference polarization and reflect ideological
choices towards one side of the political spectrum. The empirical evaluation of the
model for 44 proposals and 111 issues of the EU legislative process requiring qualified
majority voting confirms the expectations of the model and suggests that implicit voting
is specifically relevant to explaining decisions leading to high or low levels of policy
change.
Keywords
Coalition formation, cooperative game theory, decision-making, EU legislative process
Introduction
In the legislative process of the European Union (EU), member governments and
supranational institutions regularly negotiate the passage of new legislation invol-
ving policy change. Inductive accounts of the legislative process show that decision
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makers of the EU commonly take decisions through ‘implicit voting’ (Golub, 1999,
2007; Hayes-Renshaw et al., 2006; Naurin and Wallace, 2008; Novak, 2010).
Implicit voting refers to the mechanism by which decision makers participating
in the process estimate the existence of an eﬀective qualiﬁed majority coalition in
negotiations preceding the ﬁnal agreement, so that an actual vote may not take
place and decisions are oﬃcially adopted ‘by consensus’. The testimony of Dutch
national representative Leendert Bal is illustrative in this regard:
If an observer were to attend Council meetings he or she would notice next to no
evidence of a qualiﬁed-majority voting. It is unusual for presidencies to ask delega-
tions to vote. The oﬃcial explanation is that presidencies will seek consensus around
the table and will thus avoid isolating colleagues. The expression of noblesse oblige is
of course very welcome but it is only part of the explanation. Qualiﬁed-majority
voting is like the sword of Damocles hanging above the negotiation table. It is in
the mind of everyone. The Presidency, the Commission and delegations assess the
state of the negotiation – almost permanently and automatically – in terms of whether
there is a qualiﬁed majority or a blocking minority. (Bal, 2004: 129)
In spite of the attested occurrence of implicit voting in the EU, theoretical
models dealing with negotiations in the EU have commonly focused on unanimous
consent (Schneider et al., 2010; Thomson et al., 2006), leaving open the question of
whether the ‘shadow of the vote’ has any inﬂuence on consensus-building. This
article delineates a new model of coalition formation, explaining how and under
what analytical conditions decision makers reach legislative decisions under the
implicit application of a qualiﬁed majority rule. The implications of the model
are evaluated across a large number of negotiations in the EU legislative process.
The model is a spatial voting game in which coalitions of decision makers with
spatial policy preferences simultaneously oﬀer proposals for a policy compromise
to a suﬃcient number of voters who will implicitly be necessary to complete the
qualiﬁed majority that constitutes a winning coalition. The model crucially assumes
that the decision makers’ incentives to choose a policy compromise strictly depend
on the balance between the policy gains they obtain from the coalitional comprom-
ise and the policy concessions they need to give to other members of the coalition in
order to see this compromise being accepted. If a qualiﬁed majority coalition oﬀers
a compromise for which no decision maker inside the coalition has incentives to
renege on in favor of another alternative, such a compromise will be selected as the
ﬁnal policy to be implemented as common legislation.
The composition of a winning coalition and the content of its compromise
proposal are the outcome of bargaining reﬂecting on the relative positions,
power and salience of decision makers. According to the behavioural rationale
posited by the model, each decision maker’s payoﬀ for accepting a coalitional
compromise depends on a combination of policy gains and policy concessions. A
decision maker who is to make a compromise with other actors in a given coalition
may consider the opportunity to switch to an alternative coalition oﬀering a
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compromise closer to her ideal preference. If, however, in comparison to the pre-
vious coalition the concessions she has to make to the members of this second
coalition outweigh the policy gains she obtains, the decision maker will not have
incentives to switch and thus will accept the original compromise. The model pre-
dicts that decision makers will select the policy compromise oﬀered by the more
compact coalition: the winning coalition in which the diﬀerences among each of the
decision makers’ policy position and the coalitional compromise are less
pronounced.
Analytically, the formation of compact coalitions implies that legislative out-
comes will have the imprint of the ideological choice preferred by a majority of
decision makers. Accordingly, the basic implication of the proposed model is that
implicit voting should be inﬂuential under conditions of ideological divergence in
the EU legislative scene. The empirical estimation of this implication relies on a
comparison between the compact coalition model and a model of unanimous
bargaining for 44 proposals and 111 issues requiring qualiﬁed majority voting
(QMV), obtained from the Decision Making in the European Union dataset
(Thomson et al., 2006).
The article is organized as follows. In the ﬁrst part, I discuss the literature on
modelling EU decision-making and the implications of implicit voting.
Subsequently, the model is presented and a case of an EU legislative negotiation
under co-decision is introduced to illustrate the reasoning of the model. Finally, I
address the quantitative evaluation of the model.
Modelling decision-making in the cooperative environment
of the EU
Eﬀorts to model how decisions in the EU are reached play a predominant role
within the existing literature. The pioneering contributions on the subject conceived
the decisional process as binary agenda non-cooperative games and focused on the
eﬀect that formal procedures have on decision-making outcomes (Crombez, 2000;
Perez de Leon, 2011; Steunenberg and Selck, 2006; Tsebelis, 1994; Tsebelis
and Garrett, 2001). Procedural models introduce important insights regarding
inter-institutional dynamics and the general reform capacity of the EU.
However, their non-cooperative assumptions, positing a strategic advantage for
legislators preferring the status quo, have proved ill equipped to explain the ten-
dency of EU decision makers to frequently reach consensual compromises (Achen,
2006b; Ko¨nig and Junge, 2009; Mattila and Lane, 2001; Selck, 2005). In this
respect, cooperative models, allowing informal interactions among decision
makers, oﬀer a more plausible explanation of decision-making outcomes in the
cooperative environment of the EU and have provided more accurate forecasts
(Thomson et al., 2006; see, for discussion, Schneider, 2008). The vast majority of
cooperative models applied to the EU are bargaining models where the formal
decision rule does not condition the behaviour of decision makers because deci-
sions are taken by unanimity (Achen, 2006a; Arregui et al., 2006; Bailer and
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Schneider, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita, 1994; Schneider et al., 2010; Van den Bos,
1991). Thus, the decision-making process appears universally inclusive, represent-
ing the interests of all decision makers.
Such a perspective crucially changes if the eﬀect of the decision rule is integrated
into informal negotiations. Implicit voting restricts the opportunities decision
makers have under unanimity principles to stubbornly claim a major representa-
tion of their particular interests. Instead, decision makers have incentives to form a
majority coalition with like-minded policy legislators. As a consequence, unlike
under unanimous voting, implicit voting is likely to generate compromises that
reﬂect a clearer ideological direction towards one side of the political spectrum.
The informal process by which decision makers take a decision by majority
voting has been extensively studied by spatial models of coalition formation in
the tradition of cooperative game theory (Bra¨uninger, 2007; Grofman, 1982;
McKelvey et al., 1978; Owen, 1995; Schoﬁeld, 1995, 2008; Sened, 1996). In the
context of the EU legislative process, however, there is little theoretical research on
how the mechanism operates. To date, the coalition formation perspective has been
represented only in the cooperative approach of Boekhoorn et al. (2006). Building
on Axelrod’s conﬂict of interest theory (Axelrod, 1970), this work posits a ‘collect-
ive good’ assumption by which players have incentives to form a winning coalition
with minimal conﬂict. In contrast, the coalitional model presented here directly
introduces a behavioural assumption to the individual utility of players, stating
that no player will join a winning coalition if there is another winning coalition
providing higher individual policy rewards. The focus on individual rationality
provides solid micro-foundations explaining incentives for why decision makers
cooperate, and posits a coalitional rationale distinct from the tendency to seek
‘equitable’ centripetal focal points (see Fiorina and Plott, 1978; McKelvey and
Ordeshook, 1990) or the willingness to avoid internal conﬂict within a coalition
(Boekhoorn et al., 2006). This perspective on the individual rationality of decision
makers allows us to directly compare the operation of the coalitional mechanism
against the unanimity mechanism posited by bargaining models, thus providing a
straightforward way to evaluate the incidence of implicit voting.
The model
Structure of the decision-making game
A committee of a simple decision-making voting game (see Felsenthal and
Machover, 1998; McKelvey et al., 1978; Owen, 1995) shall be set up in order to
characterize how decision makers take decisions under the implicit application of a
majority rule. Let N be the set of players who are decision makers attempting to
inﬂuence the outcome of legislative negotiations. Let C  N be the coalitions that
players can form, and v a mapping that assigns payoﬀs to each coalition. In the
simple game, only the winning coalition, W, gathering at least a qualiﬁed majority
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of the weighted votes of the committee can ensure the acceptance of a ﬁnal policy
proposal and impose it on the whole assembly of the players, so that
W ¼ C  N Cj j4 3
4

 
where Cj j denotes the number of weighted votes in a coalition C. The ﬁnal outcome
takes the form in which the winning coalition is assigned the total value of the game
(that is, the total payoﬀs of the game, which its members are to divide among
themselves), while losing coalitions get nothing, so that the solution of the game
is deﬁned by the characteristic function that speciﬁes that W ¼ fCjvðCÞ ¼ 1g. The
characteristic function thus states that any player can secure a payoﬀ from the
game only by being member of the winning coalition. Even if a player considers the
status quo to be a valuable outcome, the characteristic function tells us that the
player can secure this outcome only if she obtains it through the formation of a
winning coalition. Otherwise she will end up with no payoﬀ or, equivalently, with a
utility loss worse than the status quo, such as the damaging of institutional rela-
tionships.1 Finally, we need to spell out that a simple game is proper if, for every
coalition CN, exactly one C, N C, is winning. That is, only one contemporary
subset of players may form a winning coalition, so that there can be no ties.
We develop this scheme further by integrating empirically oriented features of a
legislative process. Suppose that conﬂict among decision makers occurs over issue
alternatives concerning how a policy is to be deﬁned, as when they have to choose
between adopting more or less stringent regulatory measures for environmental
policy or higher or lower harmonization standards of safety in transport policy. We
further note that most proposals submitted for legislation are multidimensional, so
that decision makers are to decide simultaneously on two or more issues to adopt
the ﬁnal policy. In particular, let us adopt a spatial representation. Let
M¼ {1, 2, 3, . . .m} be the set of all issues represented in an m-dimensional
Euclidian metric space Rm. Let A be the real number segment describing the set
of alternative outcomes the players confront among the larger set M, so that
A 2 Rm is the convex hull representing the Pareto set of the game. Let any
player have an ideal position in the space, denoted as xi.
I deﬁne the utility function of a player as incorporating the policy gains the
player is to obtain from an outcome and the policy concessions the player needs to
give other players in order to get this outcome accepted. In evaluating alternative
outcomes, any player chooses the outcome for which the combination of policy
gains and policy concessions oﬀers her a greater utility. To capture this behavioral
rationale, I thus deﬁne the preference of a player for an outcome as the sum of the
player’s Euclidean metric distance between the ideal position of the player and the
policy outcome and the distance between each of the other players’ position and the
outcome, divided by the number of partners integrating the assembly or group in
which the player participates. Formally, let U be a utility function representing the
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preference proﬁle of all players on A. Then, for any actor i 2 N and any outcome
 2 A, there is a point xi 2 Rm such that
UiðÞ ¼ h
P
j2N k  xi k þ k  xj k
 
P
j2N
 !
ð1Þ
where h is a decreasing function on the outcome and i 6¼ j. The ﬁrst term in the
numerator of the main expression equals the policy gains that player i estimates
from the policy outcome, these gains being larger the less the Euclidian distance
from the ideal position of the player to the outcome. The second term in the
numerator equals the policy concessions that each of the other players, j, claim
in exchange for implementing this outcome. The assumption that a player will be
willing to give policy concessions follows naturally from the fact that only players
who are represented in the winning coalition obtain a payoﬀ from the game. If a
player does not give other players suﬃcient concessions, the derived increase in
disutility for these other players will make them choose a diﬀerent partner and, a
fortiori, a diﬀerent outcome. Players who are distant from the policy outcome are
more ‘expensive’ to the rest of the players and need to give more concessions. It is
important to note that, owing to the diﬀerent policy positions of each player, the
policy concessions they claim will diﬀer accordingly. A player thus considers the
gains and costs for every other player separately and then aggregates these quan-
tities to deﬁne her total utility from the coalition. In addition, when two players
have the same position, this will also be reﬂected in the outcome. As a consequence,
and since no concessions are required, players with the same position are treated
here as a single player.
Finally, the division by the total number of partners in the group corrects for the
eﬀect that groups of more players will automatically give less utility to the player,
because she will need to give more concessions even if other players are close in the
policy space.
Coalitional bargaining: The compact coalition solution
In the voting spatial game just deﬁned, players have to select a policy outcome 
over all possible alternatives that will be supported by a winning coalition. How is
this policy outcome to be found? Following McKelvey et al.’s (1978) conception of
competition among coalitions, I represent the selection of an outcome as a process
in which potential coalitions compete in oﬀering proposals for a policy compromise
to individual players in order to gain suﬃcient support to form a winning coalition
that will enforce the policy.
In order to deﬁne these compromise proposals, we ﬁrst need to know more
about the players. Following standard assumptions of cooperative bargaining
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models (Achen, 2006a; Arregui et al., 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman,
1994; Van den Bos, 1991), I deﬁne a player i as holding three characteristics by
which the player can exert inﬂuence over the content of a policy. These character-
istics are common knowledge, so that decision-making occurs under complete
information. First, as already noted, a player has a policy position, xi, in an
m-dimensional policy space. Other things being equal, players can exert
more inﬂuence in negotiations when their position is proximate to that of other
players. Conversely, players holding extreme preferences will be less inﬂuential.
Secondly, a player holds a certain amount of voting power or capabilities,
c, which makes her more or less decisive in the adoption of a decision by the
whole assembly. Finally, a player attaches a certain salience to issues. Salience
captures how much the policy space means to the player, and hence determines
how much eﬀort the player is willing to spend on negotiations. Thus, a player can
be described by a vector of three values, (xi, ci, si), always in a Euclidian space with
metric properties.2
When players form a coalition with other players, they will bargain over the
composition of the policy position that the coalition is to adopt as a collective
entity. Given the characteristics of the players, the bargaining process will derive a
policy position of the coalition, which is deﬁned as the vector consisting of the
weighted average of the positions of all players, where the weights are their voting
power and salience. The speciﬁc way in which the bargaining is conducted could, of
course, be diﬀerent. Any existing cooperative bargaining model could be used to
obtain a policy position for the coalition without modifying the logical consistency
of the model. The weighted average of positions or ‘gravity centre’ has, however,
well-established support in the literature on coalition formation (see Boekhoorn
et al., 2006; Grofman, 1982; Schoﬁeld, 1995, 2008). The speciﬁcation of a bargain-
ing process for deﬁning coalition positions implies that any coalition position will
be a feasible outcome,  2 A, and guarantees that the Pareto set A will be ﬁnite.
We can now deﬁne a compromise proposal as a policy position of a coalition
that can gather a suﬃcient number of votes to win. More precisely:
Deﬁnition 1 A compromise proposal of CN is an ordered pair (; C), such that
 2 v (C) (McKelvey et al., 1978: 606)
The question that arises is whether there is a compromise proposal that satisﬁes
these conditions, so that it can be selected as the ﬁnal policy. In principle, any
policy point from the set of alternatives A that can be implemented by a winning
coalition will be preferred by the players of this coalition and will constitute a
viable compromise proposal. As long as two players who are pivotal in winning
coalitions have diverging preferences for the proposals of these coalitions, no policy
will dominate the others and the social choice will be cyclical. Given the application
of a decision rule, it follows that a compromise proposal can be selected as a stable
outcome only if it is undominated by any other policy. The set of undominated
policies in set A is known as the core.
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Traditional theories of coalition formation commonly face the prediction prob-
lem of an empty core with more than one policy dimension (McKelvey, 1976;
Owen, 1995). Under a supermajority rule, the existence of the core can be guaran-
teed for two dimensions (Schoﬁeld et al., 1988). However, the size of the core may
still be extremely large in these situations. I will show, however, that the behavioral
assumption introducing motivations of policy gains and concessions into the pref-
erence proﬁle of players induces a strict reduction of undominated points with any
voting rule and, under conditions of asymmetry of player positions and weights,
allows us to ﬁnd a unique policy choice. I start presenting these results by ﬁrst
introducing a general deﬁnition derived from McKelvey et al. (1978: 606) stating
that only the players who are at the intersection of coalitions, ‘pivotal players’, are
relevant for the choice of a policy compromise:
Deﬁnition 2 For any two policy compromise proposals (; C) and (0; C0), (; C) is
undominated by (0; C0) if it is not the case that u(0) >iu() for all i 2 C\C0.
To see how this relation of dominance applies to the present model, we need
only to compare the utility functions of players for the potential winning coalitions
in a voting game. The player motivations for policy gains and policy concessions
when joining a coalition reveal that undominated coalitions will be the coalitions in
which the diﬀerences between each of the members’ policy position and the coali-
tional compromise will be less pronounced than in any other coalition. I will refer
to these coalitions as compact coalitions.3 The following result restates this ﬁnding,
which, as for the following results, is formally proved in the Web Appendix.
Proposition 1 For any two proposals ð;CÞ and ð0;C0Þ,ð;CÞ is undominated by
ð0;C0Þ if, given the preference proﬁle U, it is not the case that C0 is more compact
than C, for all i 2 C \ C0
From this proposition it follows that the existence of a set of compact coalitions
in a simple game guarantees stable outcomes. We now demonstrate that such a set
always exists if a game is proper and ﬁnite.
In a proper voting game, the odd number of votes allocated to players ensures
that only a contemporary subset of winning coalitions will form. Moreover, when
the number of players is ﬁnite and each coalition makes only one proposal, the set
of feasible outcomes will be ﬁnite. Under these two conditions, the formation of a
unique set of winning coalitions that are more compact than any other coalition
outside this set is assured. It is also clear that there will always be an ordering of
compact coalitions, so that it is impossible that compact coalitions ‘mutually dom-
inate’ each other. Therefore, all points in the set will be undominated and the set
will not be empty.
Proposition 2 In any ﬁnite and proper spatial voting game, there is always a set of
compromise proposals oﬀered by compact coalitions which dominate any other point
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outside the set, and which are undominated by any other point in the set. Let kcom  A
denote the set of compromise proposals oﬀered by compact coalitions, then:
com ¼ fð;CÞ 2 A for noð0;C0Þ 2 A it is the case that uð0Þ4 iuðÞ for all i 2 vðCÞg

ð2Þ
com 6¼ ; ð3Þ
Expression (2) is a standard deﬁnition of the core. It diﬀers only in the non-
standard deﬁnition of compromise proposals, as induced by the utility functions of
players based on combined policy gains and concessions. Expression (3) simply
restates that the compact coalition core is not empty.
The existence of a non-empty compact coalition set constitutes the general solu-
tion of the game. As in other core-related solutions, there is no insistence that the
set kcomcontains only one element (see Owen, 1995). Alternatives in the set may be
only weakly preferred to other alternatives in the set by all pivotal actors. Yet the
cases where we ﬁnd several stable outcomes are special cases in which there is
perfect symmetry in the distribution of player positions and player weights in the
policy space. Such conditions of symmetry are rare. In most cases we will have only
one element in the set.
Proposition 3 In any ﬁnite and proper spatial voting game, under conditions of asym-
metry in the distribution of player positions and player weights, the set of compromise
proposals oﬀered by compact coalitions contains a unique point that strictly domin-
ates any other point outside the set.
The results just presented allow us to predict a set of stable policy outcomes that
will be supported by a qualiﬁed majority of decision makers in committees such as
the EU legislature. Based on the behavioral rationale that decision makers consider
both policy gains and concessions in their choice of a common policy, they will
select a policy implemented by a coalition that is more compact than the rest. The
compact coalition constitutes a stable outcome because the combination of gains
and concessions in this coalition turns out to be more rewarding for any pivotal
member in the coalition when compared with other alternatives. Whereas symmet-
ric conditions produce several compact coalitions of indiﬀerent players, asymmetric
conditions bring together like-minded legislators in a unique compact coalition. A
single compact coalition is thus expected to form in policy-making situations where
decision makers compete to bring about a policy change towards a determined
ideological direction.
Coalition formation in the EU legislative process
The model is illustrated for the case concerning the negotiation for the adoption of
EU Directive 2002/7/EC by co-decision, relating to the maximum authorized
Perez de Leon 521
 at Sciences Po on July 16, 2014eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
dimensions and weights for road vehicles circulating within the Community. The
data for this case are part of a larger dataset of the Decision Making in the
European Union (DEU) project, which collects information about legislative pro-
posals for the EU15. Dedicated to the quantitative evaluation of the model, more
details about the structure of the data are explained in the next section. The interest
now is to show the reasoning of the coalitional model.
The ﬁrst information we need to apply to the model refers to the institutional
structure of the voting game, that is, the quota of votes needed to form a winning
coalition that can implement the decision. In order to represent the EU voting
game under co-decision (Art. 169 TEU, amended by Art. 294 of the Treaty of
Lisbon as ‘ordinary legislative procedure’), I adopt the DEU modelling strategy
for cooperative games. This strategy ‘endogenizes’ the procedural power of EU
institutions by always including them as members of the winning coalition (see
Thomson and Stokman, 2006: 49–50). For the speciﬁc co-decision procedure, we
consider only the members of the Council and the European Parliament (EP) as
decisive players. Although the European Commission introduces the legislative
proposal in the co-decision procedure, its exclusion as a decisive player is justiﬁed
because its capacity to strategically vary its proposal is limited to the ﬁrst stages of
the procedure.4
These features are operationalized more precisely with the use of the Shapley
Shubik Power Index, which measures the relative capacity of decision makers to
turn a coalition from winning to losing (see Felsenthal and Machover, 1998). In the
rule structure of the voting game for the EU15 regime, the governments in the
Council need to gather 62 out of 87 votes to form a winning coalition, and under
co-decision the EP is always required to complete the winning coalition. This is
equivalent to saying that a winning coalition can form when the Council has
gathered 0.69 of the total voting power and the EP 0.31. Translating the voting
power scores into a voting rule or quota, the voting game for the EU co-decision
procedure then takes the following form:5
½62þ 25; 25, 10, 10, 10, 10, 8, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 2
The data concerning the factors by which decision makers can inﬂuence the
negotiation are their voting power, ci, the initial declaration of preferences for
the issues under discussion, xi, and the importance they attach to the issues, si.
Table 1 presents the information about these values for the proposal on Directive
2000/7/EC. The voting power of each decision maker, ci, is calculated with the
Shapley Shubik Power Index. The voting power is proportional to the number of
votes of each decision maker. Thus, big member states, with 10 votes, have voting
power scores of 0.08, whereas a small state such as Luxembourg has a score of
0.014. As noted, the EP always holds a voting power score of 0.31. The two other
values, xi and si, are derived from empirical information and are hence speciﬁc to
the issues under negotiation. During the discussions of the proposal for Directive
2000/7/EC, decision makers declared discrepancies concerning two issues: the
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accredited maximum length authorized for vehicles, and whether the type of man-
oeuvrability of vehicles should correspond to the criteria laid down by the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) or by EU Directive 97/27/
EC. The positions of decision makers and the importance they attach to these two
issues are presented as a continuum for each issue of the proposal, representing the
gradation between two extremes of a controversy, issue-by-issue. The status quo
(SQ) is located at position 0, and position 100 corresponds to the position of the
decision maker favoring the most radical policy change in regard to the SQ.
It should be noted that the location of the status quo is not relevant for deducing
which coalition will form in the cooperative voting game. Players will, no matter
how close to or how far from the status quo this policy is, determinately prefer the
policy that aﬀords them more rewards in terms of gains and concessions. However,
the reference to the SQ as point ‘0’ in the policy space allows us to infer the degree
of policy change generated by the legislative process (see Achen, 2006b; Ko¨nig and
Junge, 2009)
Table 1. Positions, saliences and voting power in the proposal for Directive 2000/7/EC
Decision makers
xi si
ciIssue 1 Issue 2 Issue 1 Issue 2
Commission 100 100 80 40 0
Belgium 50 0 40 50 0.037
Denmark 50 100 70 70 0.024
Germany 100 0 90 90 0.080
Greece 100 0 60 80 0.037
Spain 50 0 90 90 0.066
France 100 0 70 80 0.080
Ireland 0 50 50 0.024
Italy 100 0 70 80 0.080
Luxembourg 50 0 40 40 0.014
Netherlands 0 0 90 80 0.037
Austria 100 0 70 70 0.031
Portugal 100 0 70 70 0.037
Finland 50 0 90 80 0.024
Sweden 50 0 90 80 0.031
UK 50 70 50 70 0.080
EP 50 100 80 40 0.310
Notes: Issue 1: Maximum length authorized to vehicles ¼ 15m (2 axles), 50¼ 13.5m (2 axles), 100¼ 12m (2
axles). Issue 2: Type of manoeuvrability of vehicles ¼UNECE criteria of manoeuvrability, 70¼ no agreement
with any proposed criteria, 100¼Directive 97/27/EC criteria of manoeuvrability.
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With this information we can examine how the process of coalitional competi-
tion unfolds. The positions of the decision makers are represented in the two-
dimensional graph of Figure 1.6 Since the Netherlands appears isolated at position
(0, 0), it is unlikely that this government lures other legislators to form a winning
coalition. Instead, the coalitional bargaining is to be restricted to the triangle-
shaped area of the ﬁgure, where we ﬁnd three distinctive groups of legislators
around the positions (100, 0), (50, 0) and (50, 100).
The model predicts the formation of a unique compact coalition oﬀering the
following compromise proposal: (71.03, 24.60: Germany, Greece, France, Italy,
Austria, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Finland, EP). No pivotal decision
maker in the coalition has incentives to renege on this compromise. As a conse-
quence, the coalition is dominant.
Figure 1 represents the outcome of the compact coalition at point . To see why
this point is dominant, recall that, according to the preference function of decision
makers, the combination of policy gains they obtain from a compromise and the
policy concessions they would need to oﬀer to the members of the coalition is to
provide a better deal for themselves. In this instance, we may naively presume that
the representatives of the EP would be tempted to look for another, more favorable
deal. The EP, in reality, could oﬀer a compromise proposal at (65.43, 33.66:
EP, Denmark, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg,
Sweden). This is point 0 in the ﬁgure, which is closer to the position of the EP.
However, the pivotal members who would be needed in both coalitions would
Figure 1. Spatial model of coalitional bargaining in the negotiations of Directive 2000/7/EC.
Notes: The horizontal dimension represents the first issue of the negotiations – dealing with
the maximum length authorized to vehicles. The vertical dimension concerns the second issue
– the criteria to determine the type of manoeuvrability of vehicles. AUS: Austria, BEL:
Belgium, DK: Denmark, EP: European Parliament, ESP: Spain, FIN: Finland, FR: France, GER:
Germany, GR: Greece, IRE: Ireland, ITA: Italy, LUX: Luxemburg, NL: Netherlands, POR:
Portugal, SQ: status quo, SWE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom.
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endure heavier losses in this second coalition by integrating Denmark and the UK.
Indeed, Denmark and the UK are more isolated than any other government in the
legislative bargaining space, and they drive the outcome further away from the
majority of governments. As a consequence, their inclusion in a coalition makes
this coalition less compact when compared with the dominant (compact) coalition.
For the EP this means that the majority of governments in the non-compact coali-
tion will claim more policy concessions, and the EP will need to pay a substantial
portion to them. In comparison with alternative proposals, the combination of
total gains and concessions of the compact coalition oﬀers a maximizing choice
to the EP. The exact measures are shown in Table 2. The EP’s utility from the
compact coalition is 3.86, while the alternative coalition gives a disutility of 5.57
units of combined distance of gains and concessions.
Leaving the compact coalition will entail a utility loss for the EP, because it
would require more expensive adjustments between policy gains and concessions.
Therefore, the supranational institution and all the pivotal member governments
have no incentives to change their choice for the compact coalition, because this
coalition will be dominant.
Empirical accuracy of the compact coalition model:
The relevance of implicit voting for EU policy change
This section quantitatively evaluates the performance of the compact coalition
model for 44 EU legislative proposals, containing 111 issues, which were decided
under QMV. The objective of this evaluation is to assess whether implicit voting
and its coalitional dynamics are relevant mechanisms by which decision makers
reach consensual decisions in the EU.
The research design employed here consists of comparing the performance of the
compact coalition model with that of the compromise bargaining model, which
posits that the preferences of all decision makers are integrated into the decision,
implying that consensus entails unanimous consent (Achen, 2006b; Thomson, 2011;
Van den Bos, 1991). Attempts to falsify the impact of implicit voting from a simple
comparison of the two models, however, involve certain diﬃculties. Part of the
problem is that coalition formation and generalized bargaining may produce
observational equivalence. It may be that the outcome selected by a qualiﬁed
majority looks exactly the same as the outcome selected by the totality of actors
in the whole assembly. To overcome this problem, I diﬀerentiate categories of
outcomes that are expected to result from coalition formation. As conceived in
the compact coalition model, coalition formation reﬂects a tendency of decision
makers to seek reinforcement of like-minded partners in order to bring the out-
come towards the ideological direction they prefer. In contrast, when decisions
are taken by unanimous consent, we should expect that ideological factors play a
minor role and that decision makers are willing to take the preferences of all
legislators into account. In this view, I will tease out the inﬂuence of implicit
voting on consensus-building by addressing the extent to which coalitional
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predictions tend to correspond to observed outcomes reﬂecting a choice from one
side of the ideological spectrum.
In the operationalization of the comparison between coalitional and unanimous
mechanisms of consensus, the compromise model has been chosen because it uses
the same ‘parameters’ as the compact coalition model. It also weights the positions
of the players, where the weights are their voting power and salience, but it does so
for all the players of the committee. Since the compromise model appeals to the
same inputs as the compact coalition model, it allows us to obtain a direct com-
parison between implicit voting and unanimous consent.7
Information on the legislative decisions has been obtained from the dataset of
the DEU research project (Thomson et al., 2006). Through expert interviews, the
DEU programme collects data on positions, salience and outcomes for 66 legisla-
tive proposals and 162 issues, decided by the co-decision and consultation proced-
ures and introduced by the Commission between 1999 and 2000. Here only 44
proposals decided under QMV are examined, because these are the only proposals
where implicit voting is relevant. All selected proposals dealt with issues that raised
controversy among the decision makers and aroused public attention. Therefore,
seemingly technical and routine proposals were excluded from the sample.
Information about the actors’ positions and saliences was collected after the
Commission had issued the proposals and before the legislative act was adopted.
Yet the actual outcomes are also included in the dataset. As we saw in the case
illustrating the model, this information is presented in an issue continuum where
the SQ is located at position 0 and position 100 corresponds to the most distant
position from the SQ. In this manner, estimation about the degree of policy change
is possible. The more distant outcomes are from the SQ, the more policy change the
legislative process generates.
The evaluation of the models uses the standard testing procedure for determin-
istic models consisting of comparing the distance between predicted outcomes and
observed outcomes (see Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994; Schneider et al.,
2010; Thomson, 2011; Thomson et al., 2006). More precisely, the testing measure
employed is the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), that is, the average size of the
forecasting error. The accuracy of predictions is then estimated by the degree of
the forecasting error they produce. As is well known, since deterministic models
predict equilibrium points that are assumed to occur with certainty (see Achen,
2006b; Junge, 2010; Morton, 1999; Signorino, 1999), they are not amenable to
probabilistic statistical evaluation. Alternative tests to estimate the quality of the
model, such as normalized predictions (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994) or
hit rates (Achen, 2006b; Schneider et al., 2010), could have been used. However,
given the structure of the data-generation process of deterministic models, the
discrepancies between observed and predicted outcomes provide a sensible measure
of forecasting accuracy (Achen, 2006b; Morton, 1999) and serve well the purpose
of comparing implicit voting and unanimous consent.
The ﬁrst test I conduct evaluates the performance of the compact coalition
model and of the compromise model for all issues and by legislative procedure.
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By doing so, we want to obtain a general assessment of the success of the models.
For this purpose, the median voter has been used as a null model. The median
provides atheoretical predictions, and therefore serves as a baseline to evaluate the
quality of the two theoretical models. Table 3 reports the predictions of the models.
Both models perform better than the median. The compromise model fares slightly
better for all issues under QMV, with a MAE of 25.56 against the 26.19 of the
compact coalition model. The diﬀerences, however, are not very big. For the co-
decision procedure, the most relevant EU procedure, the compact coalition model
performs better, with a MAE of 26.84 against the 27.28 of the compromise model.
Overall, coalition formation and generalized bargaining tend to oﬀer very similar
results in this comprehensive test. We can conﬁrm that consensus is generally
preferred by EU decision makers, yet we cannot conﬁrm whether a majority of
decision makers will be enough to make a consensual decision.
Despite the similarity of predictions, the association between the forecasts of the
two models in a linear transformation, with a Pearson correlation of 0.58, turns out
to be lower than we had assumed. This indicates that the diﬀerent causal mechan-
isms of the two models can also be witnessed in the data.
The second test performed seeks to evaluate more directly the impact of implicit
voting by focusing on its causal mechanism. For this purpose, I diﬀerentiate out-
comes reﬂecting ideological choices that are expected to result from coalition for-
mation. Given the structure of our data, ideological choices are represented as
outcomes pointing to more or less pronounced policy change.8 I thus perform
the MAE test for diﬀerent levels of policy change, ranging from minimum to
pronounced policy change. I expect that, if ideological factors are inﬂuential, deci-
sion makers will tend to build majoritarian coalitions, which in turn will cause
outcomes to be at a determined level of policy change. By contrast, I expect that if
ideological factors have a minor eﬀect, decision makers will prefer to form a ‘grand
coalition’ of all the actors, implying a lesser impact of coalition formation on the
level of policy change. Naturally, our evaluation of implicit voting in this design
needs to be posited in relative terms. If, relative to the compromise bargaining
model, the compact coalition model performs better for a determined level of
Table 3. Mean Absolute Error of models for all decisions under
co-decision (COD) and consultation (CNS) procedures of the EU legislative
process
Model
QMV
COD
(n¼ 56)
CNS
(n¼ 55)
All issues
(n¼ 111)
Median voter model 30.64 30.62 30.63
Compromise model 27.28 23.84 25.56
Compact coalition model 26.84 25.54 26.19
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policy change, then policy change will be driven more by implicit voting and less by
unanimous consent. If, on the contrary, this is not the case, we should conclude
that implicit voting has no inﬂuence on consensus-building and that decision
makers are inclined to adopt all-inclusive compromises by unanimity.
Table 4 shows the MAE for three levels of policy change. According to their
location on an issue continuum bounded between 0 and 100, observed outcomes
are coded as promoting low, moderate or pronounced policy change. We can see
that the prediction of the compact coalition model is more uniformly distributed
than the prediction of the compromise model, as estimated by the error the models
yield for the three levels of policy change.
This result suggests that implicit voting does have an inﬂuence on the way
consensus is taken, and, ultimately, on the ideological direction of this consensus.
The fact that both minimal policy change and pronounced policy change are better
predicted by the compact coalition model informs us that decision makers attempt
to align themselves with other like-minded partners in order to inﬂuence the policy
outcome they prefer. In addition, they are willing to make policy concessions to
those partners in order to increase the chances that a majority will select a policy
close to this outcome.
Yet the compromise model fares remarkably better when decisions are moder-
ate. Given our testing measure, the fact that the mean-oriented compromise model
is favored in situations of medium levels of policy change is not surprising (see
Bueno de Mesquita, 2004). However, the diﬀerences in prediction are wide enough
to prompt some informed conclusions. The ‘grand coalition’ thus appears to be a
superior mechanism when conditions for consensus reﬂect the existence of a centric
voter. In this case, excluding any decision maker from the compromise seems to be
either unsuitable or unnecessary. Decision makers prefer to disregard minor ideo-
logical divergences and take everyone on board in the ﬁnal decision. The compact
coalition model also predicts well in moderate decisions, but not as well as the
compromise model. In this view, the ﬁnal interpretation derived from the evidence
is that, when controversy is less acute, decision makers have a tendency to act
unanimously. However, when issues are more ideologically polarized, implicit
Table 4. Mean Absolute Error of compromise model and compact coalition model for differ-
ent levels of policy change in EU legislative output
Minimal policy
change
Moderate policy
change
Pronounced policy
change
Model
Outcome range:
0–30 (n¼ 27)
Outcome range:
30–60 (n¼ 36)
Outcome range:
60–100 (n¼ 48)
Compromise model 42.92 13.84 25.10
Compact coalition model 36.30 23.73 22.30
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voting appears to be a more determinant mechanism in the conﬁguration of con-
sensual decisions.
Conclusion
Theoretical explanations and empirical assessments of how consensual agreements
in the EU are reached have commonly focused on unanimous consent. However,
the question of whether consensus may be reached under the ‘Damocles sword’ of a
qualiﬁed majority has received little rigorous theoretical treatment. The article
addresses this shortcoming with a model of coalition formation positing that deci-
sion makers select a majoritarian compromise by pondering the policy gains they
are to obtain from a compromise and the policy concessions they need to give in
order to see this outcome supported by a qualiﬁed majority. The result of the
legislative bargaining in which decision makers evaluate diﬀerent choice alterna-
tives is the formation of a compact coalition to implement the ﬁnal policy.
At the theoretical level, the compact coalition model yields the ﬁnding of a stable
solution for ﬁnite and proper spatial voting games, which usually have an empty core.
The proposed solution thus relates to other classic core solutions of well-established
cooperative theories, and suggests a reﬁnement to these solutions. This article does not
intend to suggest that decision makers’ motivations to exchange policy gains and con-
cessions in order to reach an agreement with a like-minded majority exist in every pol-
itical situation. Nonetheless, it is natural to assume that they do exist in cooperative
decision-making environments where the penalization for not reaching an agreement is
high. The EU legislative process is commonly perceived as such a cooperative environ-
ment. At the empirical level, the quantitative evaluation of the model yields mixed
results. The evidence suggests that, in the EU legislative process, ideological majorities
vote implicitly in order to drive consensus towards minimum or pronounced levels of
policy change.However,whenmajoritieshavemoderatepolicy choices, theyare inclined
to take everybody on board and unanimous consent remains a powerful mechanism.
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Notes
1. Specifically, let ui be the utility that any player can secure by acting alone, then ui  wi for
all i 2 C and w 2 vðCÞ.
2. In the set of issues M¼ {1, 2, 3 . . .m}, where m  1, a player’s position on an issue, and the
influence she can exert on the issue,maydiffer fromthat takenonanother issue. Suchvariations
will be reflected in the overall influence the player exerts on a given policy vector  2A.
3. The word ‘compact’ is unrelated to and should not be confused with the notion of
‘compactness’ and ‘compact set’, which is used to refer to closed and bounded sets,
which contain an infinite number of choices.
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4. The modelling strategy of the co-decision procedure thus corresponds to the Shapley
Shubik Index Second Variant of EU inter-institutional interaction specified in the
DEU research design. In the larger dataset, I also consider proposals under the consult-
ation procedure, where the Commission has the possibility to change its proposal at any
stage, while the EP has only a consultative function. The form of the voting game remains
as indicated. However, I reverse the roles of the Commission and the EP, so that, in the
consultation procedure, it is the Commission that is a decisive player and has a voting
power score of 0.31, whereas the EP is a dummy player. This corresponds to the Shapley
Shubik Index First Variant of the DEU research design.
5. When some member states are indifferent to issues under discussion and do not partici-
pate in the process of its resolution, the quota will be readjusted. The proposal illustrated
here offers an example: Ireland, holding 3 votes, is indifferent regarding the first issue, so
that the Council has 84 active votes. Then a winning coalition will need 60 votes of the
Council and 24 of the supranational institution.
6. For simplicity of exposition I have not represented the power and salience of decision
makers in the graph. Note, however, that these weights are reflected in the two alternative
outcomes.
7. One difference between the two models, however, is the coding of indifferent actors.
Proponents of the compromise model give indifferent actors a position halfway between
the proposal of the Commission and the reference point. I have maintained their original
coding in running their model here.
8. For a related test on the ability of models to predict change from the status quo, see
Achen (2006b).
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